AdaptixC2 Emerges in npm Supply-Chain Exploit Against Developers
Cybersecurity researchers at Kaspersky have uncovered a sophisticated supply chain attack targeting the npm ecosystem. Threat actors distributed the AdaptixC2 post-exploitation framework through a malicious package disguised as a legitimate proxy utility.
Cybersecurity researchers at Kaspersky have uncovered a sophisticated supply chain attack targeting the npm ecosystem. Threat actors distributed the AdaptixC2 post-exploitation framework through a malicious package disguised as a legitimate proxy utility.
This discovery highlights the increasing risk of open-source software repositories being used as attack vectors for delivering advanced malware.
In October 2025, Kaspersky experts identified a malicious npm package named "https-proxy-utils," designed to deceive developers into installing malware on their systems. The package mimicked legitimate proxy-related utilities, presenting itself as a tool for managing proxies within development projects.
The threat actors enhanced its credibility by cloning functionality from "proxy-from-env," a popular legitimate package with approximately 50 million weekly downloads.
The malicious package's name was crafted to resemble trusted packages like "http-proxy-agent" and "https-proxy-agent," which collectively receive over 160 million downloads per week. This typosquatting technique exploits developers who may accidentally install the wrong package or fail to verify package names carefully.
Although the malicious package has been removed from the npm registry, the incident demonstrates how attackers can exploit the trust developers place in open-source ecosystems.
The attack was notable for its sophisticated multi-platform delivery mechanism. The malicious package contained a post-install script that automatically executed upon installation, downloading and deploying the AdaptixC2 agent tailored to the victim's operating system.
Cybersecurity researchers at Kaspersky have uncovered a sophisticated supply chain attack targeting the npm ecosystem.
AdaptixC2, publicly available since early 2025, serves as an alternative to the Cobalt Strike post-exploitation framework and was first observed being used maliciously in spring 2025.
For Windows systems, the attack used DLL sideloading techniques by dropping the AdaptixC2 agent as a DLL file into the C:\Windows\Tasks directory. It then copied the legitimate "msdtc.exe" file to the same location and executed it, which loaded the malicious DLL.
On macOS, the payload was downloaded as an executable into the Library/LaunchAgents directory, with a plist configuration file for persistence. The script detected whether the system was running x64 or ARM architecture and fetched the appropriate payload variant.
Linux systems were targeted differently, with the framework's agent being downloaded into the /tmp/.fonts-unix temporary directory. Similar to the macOS implementation, the script delivered architecture-specific binary files for x64 or ARM systems and assigned execute permissions to enable the malware to run.
Once deployed, the AdaptixC2 framework provides attackers with extensive capabilities, including remote access, command execution, file and process management, and multiple persistence methods. These features allow threat actors to maintain continuous access to compromised systems, conduct network reconnaissance, and deploy additional attack stages. The framework can transform a developer's machine into a foothold for broader network infiltration.
This incident is part of a trend of supply chain attacks targeting npm. A month prior to this discovery, the Shai-Hulud worm infected more than 500 npm packages using similar post-install script techniques.
These incidents underscore how threat actors increasingly exploit the trusted open-source supply chain to distribute post-exploitation frameworks and other malware. Organizations and developers who rely on npm packages in their products face significant exposure to these threats.
Security experts recommend several protective measures for developers and organizations using open-source software. Users should verify package names before installation, thoroughly vet unpopular and newly created repositories, and monitor updated feeds on compromised packages and libraries.
The AdaptixC2 incident serves as a reminder that even routine development activities like installing dependencies can become entry points for sophisticated cyberattacks when proper security practices are not followed.
Based on reporting by GBHackers.
