Simple Custom Font Rendering Can Poison ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, and Other AI Systems
A recent examination has unveiled a vulnerability in AI web assistants, revealing a disparity between the visual rendering of a webpage and the textual data parsed by AI tools.
A recent examination has unveiled a vulnerability in AI web assistants, revealing a disparity between the visual rendering of a webpage and the textual data parsed by AI tools.
By utilizing a custom font file and basic CSS, attackers can embed harmful instructions that bypass AI safety checks, which only perceive benign content.
The vulnerability was identified in December 2025, exploiting the difference between the Document Object Model (DOM) text of a webpage and its rendered visual output. AI assistants generally process the raw HTML, while browsers display the page using fonts, CSS, and glyph mappings, which can be manipulated by attackers.
LayerX demonstrated this vulnerability through a proof-of-concept webpage designed to appear as a fanfiction site for the video game Bioshock . The custom font used acted as a visual substitution cipher, displaying standard HTML text as indistinct gibberish while presenting a hidden payload as visible text, instructing users to execute malicious actions.
Various AI assistants, including ChatGPT, Claude, Copilot, Gemini, and others, were unable to detect the threat, often confirming the page's safety. The vulnerability does not require JavaScript, exploit kits, or browser flaws, as it resides in AI tools that equate DOM text with user-visible content.
By utilizing a custom font file and basic CSS, attackers can embed harmful instructions that bypass AI safety checks, which only perceive benign content.
LayerX reported the findings to major AI vendors in December 2025. Responses varied significantly:
Vendor Response
Microsoft Accepted the report; requested a full 90-day remediation period Google Initially prioritized as high, later de-escalated and closed on Jan. 27, 2026 OpenAI Rejected as "out of scope" due to insufficient impact Anthropic Rejected as social engineering, considered out of scope xAI Rejected; directed to safety@x.ai Perplexity Classified as a known limitation, not a security vulnerability
Microsoft was the sole vendor to fully address the issue within the disclosure timeline.
The primary risk involves AI-assisted social engineering, where attackers leverage AI tools to endorse malicious pages. LayerX advises AI vendors to adopt dual-mode render-and-diff analysis, treat custom fonts as potential threats, scan for CSS-based content hiding methods, and avoid issuing definitive safety assessments without verifying the complete rendering context.
Based on reporting by Cyber Security News.
